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ABSTRACT 
In 2009 the European Union (EU) reached a crucial moment in its history, in which 
the terms Europe and crisis became conjoined: the European sovereign-debt crisis, or 
Euro-crisis. Yet enlargement remains on the agenda, with the EU’s next enlargement 
starting on 1st July 2013 with the accession of Croatia, Iceland and FYROM looking 
set to follow in the near future, and probably other Western Balkan states and 
possibly Turkey in the long term. Enlargement therefore will soon come back into 
focus. Focusing on climate and energy security policy, this working paper first 
reflects upon the impact of the 2004/2007 enlargement on the EU. A reflection on 
the EU’s recent past with some of the lessons that can be learnt then follows, with a 
consideration that predictions of decision- and policy-making gridlock were not 
realised, that newer member states have proved influential, and that prospective 
member states cannot be expected to be passive nor impotent. The latter part of this 
paper evaluates the potential prospects and outcomes of these lessons with regard 
to future enlargement from within (Scotland and Catalonia), and without (Turkey), 
and the political factors which may dictate whether these possible enlargements are 
realised.  
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1 Introduction: All Quiet on the (South) Eastern Front? 
EMMANUEL DALLE MULLE, GERBEN WEDEKIND, INGE DEPOORTER, THOMAS SATTICH 
& TOMAS MALTBY 
 
 
 
In 2009 the European Union (EU) reached a crucial moment in its history, in which the 
terms Europe and crisis became conjoined: the European sovereign-debt crisis, or Euro-
crisis. All eyes since have been turned on the Eurozone, which saw a series of high-level 
summits and a number of emergency measures with the aim of saving the common 
currency. Another prominent feature of the history of the EU has been somewhat 
forgotten in the course of these dramatic events: the EU’s 2004/2007 enlargement. 
Expectations were that this enlargement round would have a profound impact on the EU 
and was expected to be the starting point of its overall transformation. Yet during the 
first years of their membership, the newer EU Member States rather became a stabilising 
element in a troubled EU, being committed to the core of the European project, while 
aspiring to eventual inclusion in the Eurozone and Schengen Agreement. Given Croatia’s 
accession in July 2013, and the membership aspirations of the Balkan countries and 
Turkey (and Iceland), from a Brussels perspective one could therefore ask: all quiet on 
the (South) Eastern front?  
 
Public opinion in the ‘old’ Member States was critical towards enlargement of the EU. 
Whereas European and national policy-makers portrayed the prospects for the EU in a 
positive light, the general public in the old Member States had a much gloomier 
perception. Integration research was not unimpressed by these somewhat mixed 
feelings, yet it reflected the ambiguous perception of the enlargement in a somewhat 
delayed fashion: many scholars at first regarded the enlargement as a historical turning 
point for European integration and expected that the expansion would change Europe 
greatly. The only question seemed to be in which way enlargement would impact the EU 
(Grabbe, 2004)? Various negative consequences were considered to be the likely result of 
the enlargement: expectations of a blockade or gridlock of policy- and decision-making 
processes were widespread (Wallace, 2007) as well as concerns regarding a potential race 
to the bottom in several policy fields (Kvist, 2004), including the environment, consumer 
protection, etc. Only a few scholars did not share these concerns (Wyplosz, 2005).  
 
Since 2004, assessment of the enlargement surmised that many initial fears were 
unrealised, concluding that it was a business as usual-scenario (Christiansen, Best and 
Settembri, 2008) became mainstream (Sedelmeier and Young, 2006). In view of the 
plethora of misgivings around 2004 this change is intriguing; if valid, it would undermine 
the widespread assumption that the Eastern countries still differ from their West-
European counterparts, and many of the earlier concerns were based on a perception of 
the new EU Member States en bloc. With Hungary, Cyprus and Slovenia heading towards 
the centre of Europe’s current political and economic crisis, this judgment may have to 
be revised (again). Secondly, since many scholars and others (e.g. Von Weizsäcker, 
Dehaene and Simon, 1999; von Carlowitz, 2001) urged for institutional reform, it 
undermines the assumption that the EU institutional structure and decision-making 
process is not able to function efficiently with more Member States. 
 
Hence, Political Science seems to reflect the mixed feelings present in the public debates 
regarding the EU-enlargement. Yet, the course of the scholarly debate on the prospects 
and dangers of the enlargement suggests that the pendulum of Political Science 
mainstream thinking simply swung from one extreme to the other – from blockade/race 
to the bottom to business as usual. It is therefore very likely that the actual outcomes of 
the enlargement are to be found between the two poles of this debate, in the grey area of 
daily European-level decision-making. This paper reflects upon the impact on, and 
lessons from, EU enlargement on climate policy and energy security policy, and evaluates 
the potential prospects and outcomes of future enlargement(s). This article presents a 
few cases as lessons from the 2004/2007 EU enlargement alongside articles which reflect 
upon prospects for future enlargement(s).  
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2 Still United in Diversity? The Impact of the EU’s 2004/2007 
Enlargement on Policy-making: The Case of European Climate 
Policy. From Politics to Policy 
THOMAS SATTICH 
 
 
 
2.1.  All quiet on the (South-) Eastern front? 
 
The following sections briefly outline the preliminary results of (ongoing) research work 
which has been conducted in the context of a doctoral thesis at the Research Centre for 
East European Studies at the University of Bremen and the Institute for European Studies 
at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel. The research work aims at a better understanding of the 
consequences of the EU’s last two enlargement rounds on the policy-making process at 
the European level. It is centred around the question, how the political system of the EU 
reacted to the impact of the new Member States. In terms of the EU’s self chosen slogan 
United in Diversity (European Union), the research work asks, in which direction the EU 
gravitated after the enlargement was accomplished: Towards more unity or more 
diversity? 
 
In order to shed some light on this question, the following sections evolve around the 
hypothesis that the accession of the new Member States to the EU resulted in a shift of 
established policy-making procedures (or patterns). This approach follows the dominant 
assessment of Political Science around 2004 (Nugent 2004, 7), which underlined the 
gridlock/blockade scenario and the assumption of significant consequences for the EU 
and its policy output (see introduction). The later assessment of Political Science (Wallace, 
2007: 5), namely the business as usual scenario, which was much less alarmist and noted 
a much less significant impact of the enlargement on EU policy-making, would have been 
equally well suited as a starting point; yet given the widespread assumption of (mostly) 
negative side effects for the EU resulting from the enlargement – namely a breakdown of 
the policy-making process, a race to the bottom with regard to high standards, and a 
historical turning point for the EU – it seems more relevant to start with the initial view.  
 
At first sight, both scenarios – gridlock/blockade and business as usual – seem to be very 
distinct, yet they both share one expectation with regard to the EU Member States: 
similar behaviour of the entire group of countries after they acceded the EU. Whereas the 
blockade scenario assumes the formation of a bloc (to exert influence on the policy-
making process), the business as usual scenario assumes just the opposite, the traceless 
absorption of the new group of countries in the given structures of European policy-
making. The question therefore is, whether the accession of ten countries from Central 
and Eastern Europe plus Malta and Cyprus indeed added a new line of conflict to 
European politics, this time New vs. Old EU Member States, or not. According to the 
above-mentioned discussions in Political Science the existence of such a divide serves as 
a hypothesis to test. Given the enlargement indeed resulted in such a new cleavage in 
European policy-making, the subsequent questions are: 1) whether this divide has an 
impact on the EU’s output?; and, 2) whether it affects European policy in a comparable 
manner in the various fields of EU policy-making? It is hypothesised that enlargement has 
had a considerable impact on the EU’s policy output.  
 
2.2.  Theory, model and case study design 
 
In order to design a research framework which allows the isolation and measurement of 
the variables, some theoretical groundwork is necessary. In this regard the study draws 
upon several theories which are widely used for the definition of European policy-making: 
1) Multi-level Governance (Marks et al., 1996; Börzel, 2008); 2) constructivist approaches 
(Risse, 2004); 3) neo-institutionalism (March and Olsen, 1998; Pierson, 2004); and, 4) the 
dimensionality of EU-level politics (Hix, 2008; Hooghe and Marks, 1999). In order to 
combine these different theories, Paul A. Sabatiers’ Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) 
serves as model of the EU policy-making process (Sabatier, 1998; Sabatier and Weible, 
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2007). The basic concept of this model is the Advocacy Coalition, a loose, informal 
network of political actors from all levels of government (supranational, national, 
subnational) and society (lobby, consultancy, science, journalism, etc.) on an issue-
specific policy field.  
 
The formation and collective action of these coalitions is based on shared world views or 
political beliefs (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194-196), and on the desire to translate these 
into legislation (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 194-196). According to this model, several 
advocacy coalitions – each based on a different set of political beliefs – compete with 
each other for influence on the policy-making result. Which coalitions prevail depends on 
personnel strength and the resources to dominate the policy field (Sabatier and Weible, 
2007: 196). According to this model policy-making and its output is very stable over 
time, as the different policy subsystems (e.g. clean air policy) normally feature one 
coalition which reflects the zeitgeist and therefore is able to dominate the policy output. 
Change therefore is measured in decades (Sabatier and Weible, 2007: 198-199). Only 
external shocks may cause quicker changes. With regard to the high quantity of the 
newcomers, the enlargement may have had enough weight to trigger quick change, by 
altering the existing balance between the advocacy coalitions on a given policy field. 
Following the blockade/business as usual framework, the enlargement could have 
resulted in a whole spectrum of consequences for the policy-making process: at one 
possible extreme the newcomers in the policy-making process formed their own 
advocacy coalition(s), on the other extreme they merge into given structures.  
 
2.3.  The case of climate policy: renewable energy and emissions trading 
 
In order to allow broad generalisation, case selection faces several premises: 1) the 
selected case has to be representative for a larger number of cases; 2) it has to fit with 
the theoretical framework; 3) the chosen model of the policy process (Sabatier, 1998); 
and, 4) the case study design. In the context of this study, only supranational, highly 
Europeanised policy fields meet the premises of the set up, notably such with regulative 
measures negotiated in a deliberative manner. Moreover, the selected cases should be 
based on earlier cases before the enlargement in order to guarantee that the new actors 
from the new Member States meet a policy subsystem, which has already been in place. 
Climate policy is well suited in all the above-mentioned respects and therefore used as a 
backdrop of the study. In order to isolate and measure the impact of the newcomers on 
EU policy-making, two separate examples for EU climate policy are analysed in parallel: 
subcase A) EU policy on greenhouse gas emission reductions and subcase B) the 
promotion of renewable energies. The study aims to assess the integration of the actors 
from the new EU Member States into the policy-making process for both subcases: the 
negotiations of A) Directive 2009/28/EC on the promotion of the use of renewable 
energy; and, B) Directive 2009/29/EC to improve and extend the greenhouse gas 
emission allowance trading scheme. 
 
A) Emissions Trading System (ETS): the hub of the discussions on the reduction of 
CO
2
 emissions was the national vs. supranational dimension. Since support for a 
market-based policy instrument was widespread already before the enlargement, 
the policy-making process resulted in a revision of the ETS. Yet, whereas the 
predecessor Directive 2003/87/EC established a decentralised policy instrument 
which left Member States much leeway for the allocation of emission allowances, 
the revision 2009/29/EC resulted in a centralised, pan-European scheme with 
harmonised rules, which has been called a governance u-turn with regard to the 
concept of hierarchy as a mode of governance. 
 
B) Renewable energies (RES): the hub of the discussions on the promotion of 
renewable energies was of a related, but slightly different nature: despite strong 
initiatives to harmonise the promotion of renewables on the basis of tradable 
certificates, Directive 2009/28/EC stayed – as its predecessor 2001/77/EC – 
indifferent with regard to a particular instrument. Hence, no harmonisation took 
place. This result clearly contradicts the internal market paradigm of the EU and 
the trend to so called new policy instruments.  
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2.4.  Case study methods: network and cluster analysis 
 
Methodologically, the case study follows a mixed methods approach; the triangulation of 
network-, cluster- and content analysis as well as process tracing. This selection is based 
on three core elements of the Advocacy Coalition Framework: 1) the ACF presumes the 
cooperation of actors in the policy-making process; network analysis is applied in order 
to visualise these interactions; 2) the ACF implies close ideological ties between the 
cooperating actors as well as common policy ideas; based on a set of categories, cluster 
analysis should identify such groups; 3) the ACF furthermore assumes that successful 
policy-making is the translation of the policy ideas of individual groups into policy 
output. Using the same set of categories as for the cluster analysis, this time to analyse 
the policy output, should allow deductions which group of actors dominated the policy-
making process and was able to translate its policy ideas into European legislation. As a 
concluding step, process tracing is applied in order to close the causal chain between 
hypotheses (changed Advocacy Coalitions, changed policy) with the policy output 
(Directives 2009/29/EC and 2009/28/EC).  
 
Since the Advocacy Coalition Framework underlines the importance of the micro level of 
policy-making and the role of the individual actor’s behaviour for the policy output, 
network and cluster analysis constitute the core of the study’s empirical part. Their 
application serves two purposes: 1) the identification of existing Advocacy Coalitions; 
and, 2) the role of the actors from the new EU Member States within them. Since the ACF 
suggests the involvement of a large variety of actors (politics, lobby groups, civil society, 
etc.), and hardly differentiates between the relevance of the individual stakeholder for the 
policy result, data collection has to be extensive. 
 
2.5.  Data collection 
 
Most of the data is qualitative and is to be quantified for the analysis with statistics 
programmes: whereas the network affiliations are collected as binary and undirected data 
(contact = 1, non-contact/no data = 0), the policy ideas of the single actors are registered 
as metric data which reflects the positions taken by the individual actors regarding a 
defined system of categories (compliance with a category = 0, indifference/no data = 1, 
non-compliance = 2). The categories thereby are based on EU typical dimensions of 
policy-making: 1) the national-supranational; and, 2) the regulative dimension of 
European policy-making. For each of the two cases 8 (2009/28/EC), respectively 7 
(2009/29/EC) categories are designed to attribute the individual actors on these 
dimensions. The attribution procedure thereby follows Sabatier’s (1993; 1998; 2007) 
political belief systems and scientific assessment with regard to the discussions on the 
European ETS and the promotion of renewable energies. The result is several data 
matrices comprising the quantified data on network affiliations (subcase A: 237 actors; B: 
157 actors) and policy ideas (subcase A: 161 actors; B: 123 actors). The two directives 
2009/29/EC and 2009/28/EC provide the data for the content analysis, whereas media 
coverage provides the data for process tracing.  
 
2.6.  Data analysis 
 
The computer programme GEPHI is utilised to calculate and visualise the networks. A 
mathematical algorithm simulates repulsion and attraction forces between nodes (= 
actors) in the network (0 = repulsion, like two magnetic fields; 1 = attraction, 
nodes/actors linked by a spring). The result is an overview over the network and densely 
interlinked regions ready for further analysis. One important aspect is the detection of 
communities within the network, which is based on the ability of GEPHI to calculate path 
distances. These communities are taken as one of two indicators for the presence of an 
advocacy coalition. Based on the number of affiliations with other actors, GEPHI 
furthermore is used to visualise central actors with an important position in the overall 
network. With regard to the actors from the new EU Member States the methods allow 
detailed insight in their network affiliations, their distribution and overall strength in the 
network as well as their presence (and absence) in the different communities. The 
computer programme moreover allows for a filtering of the results, and thus to 
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determine, whether the actors from the new EU Member States played a role among the 
group of the most central stakeholders.  
 
The statistics programme XLSTAT is used to calculate and visualise clusters of actors with 
common policy ideas according to their placement in the system of categories. Using 
Ward’s minimum variance method for a hierarchical agglomerative clustering (Euclidian 
distance) the results show a dendrogram which visualises the various clusters. The 
individual clusters thereby are the second indicator for the presence of an advocacy 
coalition. Advocacy coalitions thus are expected, where communities in the network and 
cluster overlap, that is to say, when the same actors are found in community and cluster. 
 
2.7.  Results 
 
The results at hand differ very much for the two cases: whereas the actors from the new 
EU Member States did form an advocacy coalition in the case of the ETS (which also 
includes a number of actors from the old EU Member States), this does not hold true for 
RES policy; here the newcomers to the policy field played a negligible role. This 
difference is striking, since the new EU Member States have been present in both 
negotiations according to their demographic weight1 in the EU, that is to say, they started 
negotiations from equal positions. However, only in the ETS case did the results of 
network and cluster analysis overlap, allowing the inference that there was the presence 
of an advocacy coalition, driven by actors from the new EU Member States. With regard to 
the secondary aim of the research work, to determine what impact the enlargement had 
on the policy-making output, the results also differ: consistent with the premises of the 
Advocacy Coalition Framework there is no measurable impact on Directive 2009/28/EC 
on renewable energy, yet the EU-12 were able to leave their mark on Directive 
2009/29/EC on the ETS.  
 
At this stage one can extrapolate some preliminary conclusions: the enlargement had an 
effect on European politics as well as on European policy. In this regard it seems that the 
EU gravitated towards more diversity. Yet given the case study selection, which singled 
out two closely related and comparable examples of European politics/policy, the effect 
is not evenly distributed over the different policy fields. Further research is required to 
explain this disparity, yet with regard to the results at hand it can be assumed that the 
impact of the enlargement is highly specific on the different policy fields. For detailed 
results of the study please see http://newrospheres.wordpress.com/. 
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3 Enlargement and EU Policy-making: How Newer Member States 
can be, and are, Influential as Agenda-Setters and Steerers in EU 
Energy Policy 
TOMAS MALTBY 
 
 
3.1.  Explaining Member State influence on EU policy-making: agenda-
setting and Europeanisation uploading: How influence is achieved 
 
Early conceptions of Europeanisation tended to focus less on the opportunities to shape 
EU policy that are conferred upon new members, and more on the impact of the EU on 
domestic politics, policy and polity (Goetz and Hix, 2000; Buller and Gamble, 2002). Such 
a conception assumes that ‘the imperatives, logic and norms of the EU become 
intrinsically absorbed into domestic policy, to the extent that the distinction between 
European and domestic policy requirements progressively ceases to exist’ (Featherstone, 
1998: 24). However, as highlighted by Radaelli (2004: 190) a top down approach can be 
problematic when restricted solely to a ‘logic in which the only aim is to find out the 
domestic effects of independent variables defined at the EU level’. This necessarily 
restricts scope to adaptation to, and implementation of, EU policy. Bulmer and Lequesne 
(2002) commented that, ‘[t]he question of how successful a Member State is in 
promoting or ‘uploading’ its policy preferences is one of the most relatively under-
researched and under-theorised in the literature on EU governance’. 
 
This article conceives of EU agenda setting and policy-making process as a holistic, bi-
directional process, which takes account of the ‘second dimension’ of Europeanisation, 
whereby Member States also seek to ‘externalise’ their national foreign policy positions 
at the EU level, success of which results in ‘Europeanised’ policy’ (Tsardanidis and 
Stavridis, 2005: 221-222; also Börzel, 2002). Once full membership is conferred upon a 
state, opportunities are available to shape EU policy through uploading, or projecting 
preferences, whilst simultaneously being shaped by EU-level pressures. The relationship 
between structure and agency (and in this context between EU institutions and EU 
Member State governments) conceived here is one that is mutually constitutive; 
accounting for the potential reflexivity of the process. This framework allows for 
consideration of the strategic behaviour of (newer) Member State actors, within the 
constraints set by EU membership. 
 
This research utilises a framework for evaluating both when, and how, EU Member States 
can influence policy-making in the EU. Princen (2011: 930-931) pinpoints two challenges 
for agenda-setters in the EU: 1) building credibility through capacity building and deriving 
authority from this; and, 2) by gaining attention through mobilising supporters and 
arousing interest (intensity and continuity of interest). Similarly, Copsey and Pamorksa 
(2010: 309) assert that the influence capacity of Member States depends on relatively 
fixed political power (size of a state's population and its economic weight), but also on 
'variable' factors: ‘the intensity of its policy preference, its skill at coalition-building, its 
administrative capacity, its persuasive advocacy, the receptiveness of other Member 
States and its domestic political strength’. Also relevant is Kingdon’s work on (successful) 
policy entrepreneurs, which posited three necessary criteria: 1) generating well-
developed proposals supported by sustained advocacy; 2) consensus- and coalition-
building with other Member State and EU institutions; 3) taking advantage of policy 
windows, which also requires policy coordination and administrative capacity (Kingdon, 
2003: 204).  
 
Uploading is then linked to five factors, which comprise the hypotheses tested in this 
deductive research: motivation, expertise, coalition-building, learning how to act in the 
EU policy-making environment and autonomy to act. The latter relates to energy 
(in)dependence and diversification opportunities and trade relations with, in this case, 
Russia. 
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Europeanisation is conceptualised not as internalisation of rules and norms of behaviour, 
but more as a compliance based on strategic calculation on the part of relevant Member 
State actors both in Brussels and national capitals. This is assumed to occur through the 
learning of appropriate norms, rules and strategies. Europeanisation then leads to 
national decision-makers making decisions on a strategically calculated basis; altering 
behaviour and strategies to take account of the context in which they are made, and the 
accepted norms of appropriateness within environments, as Ladrech (1994: 17) 
commented, ‘an incremental process reorienting the direction and shape of politics to 
the degree that EC political and economic dynamics become part of the organisational 
logic of national politics and policy-making’. It is hypothesised that ‘actor self- interest 
effectively ‘maps on’ to ‘appropriate’ behaviour’, and varies over time and depending on 
the issue (Goldmann, 2005: 43), rather than there being a clearly delineated distinction 
between the logics of appropriateness and consequentiality (March and Olsen, 1998). It is 
considered that strategies employed alter over time, but not necessarily values. Whilst 
the latter shift posited by Sociological Institutional accounts, a transformation of values 
and identity effected by Europeanisation, is not ruled out, it is largely precluded from this 
analysis due to the difficulty of discerning between the two by the methodology 
employed here, the examination of sources through triangulating explicit statements in 
interviews2, policy documents and the interpretation of secondary sources. 
 
3.2. Agenda and policy-making influence in energy policy; hypotheses 
	  
Since the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, the structure (EU 
institutions, rules, decision-making procedures, norms and informal ‘rules of the game’) 
and agents (Member State actors) have been co-constituted. Even at the level of high 
politics membership constrains autonomy by ensuring that strategic action of Member 
State actors necessarily occurs within and is orientated towards the context of EU 
membership, and at the same time impacts and affects the institutions (and other actors) 
in which the interaction occurs (Hay, 2002: 127). The conception of Europeanisation 
employed here is one which conceives of agents in line with Jessop’s strategic relational 
approach, their ‘strategically calculating structural orientation’ occurs within ‘structurally 
inscribed strategic selectivity’ (2001). Rules and informal norms can be contextually 
dependent. The options of strategic actors are dependent upon a reflection on what 
actions are considered to be appropriate in a particular context. 
 
Here it is the extent to which, since their 2004 and 2007 enlargements, two newer 
Member States (Poland and Bulgaria) have attempted to, and succeeded in, shaping 
energy policy which is evaluated – selected as an example of a policy area that has been 
high on the EU’s agenda in recent years, and has led to considerable decision, policy and 
legislative outputs. In doing so through a bi-directional holistic Europeanisation lens, the 
research allows for and tests (strategic), and norm advocacy and leadership (Björkdahl, 
2008). It also considers the role of intersubjective understandings of energy security, 
how these evolve, and how such perceptions can be affected by actors and events. 
 
How newer, non-large, Member States can influence policy- and decision-making in the 
EU: 
 
• Utilising regional and strategic alliance-building; 
 
• Diplomatic skill and learning over time of the ‘rules of the game’ 
(intensity of interest / government prioritisation); 
 
• Relations with Russia as this factor can act to constrain or incentivise / an 
active role in energy policy-making, depending on extent of energy 
dependence and broader political and economic relations; 
 
• Authority derived from demonstrable expertise, related to administrative 
capacity; 
                                                
2 Interviews conducted in Brussels, Warsaw and Sofia, with officials from the Commission, 
national Ministries, energy attachés in Permanent Representatives, national energy companies, 
academics, journalists and think tanks between 2010 and 2013. 
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• Windows of opportunity for policy developments (the impact of supply 
disruptions). 
 
 
3.3. Poland as a newer member state agenda-setter: Assertive, and becoming 
effective. 
 
Polish influence has been significant. Successive governments have focused on energy 
policy and EU-Russia relations. Since accession, Poland’s capacity to exert influence has 
increased, determined by diplomatic learning resulting in a more consensus style of 
negotiating, and the Polish government has increasingly adopted appropriate norms, 
rules and strategies for the uploading of national preferences. The credibility of Polish 
government energy policy proposals has been derived increasingly from demonstrable 
expertise, and increased administrative capacity and a move towards a more ‘results 
oriented not procedure orientated’ civil service culture. Through persuasive advocacy and 
improved alliance-building (within the Visegrád Group) Polish governments have 
capitalised on a policy window created by gas supply disruptions, that in turn affected 
Member States receptiveness to Polish preferences. 
 
Poland then had medium initial impact, then quite substantial within a few years of 
accession. This was achieved through concentrating resources and diplomatic energy on 
the issue, appealing to norms of ‘solidarity’, achieving EU recognition of importance of 
regions in the Single Market, and achieving a ‘spirit of solidarity’ in energy relations in 
the Lisbon Treaty. The Visegrád regional grouping has been useful for example 
immediately prior to Council summits, as have bilateral coordination with Member States 
such as Lithuania, and trilateral with France and Germany. In Poland, Russia has had a far 
lesser constraining influence on policy-making, but has provided a focus of energy and 
foreign policy efforts of the Polish government with regard to participating in EU policy- 
and decision-making. The history of conflict with Russia and recent supply disruptions 
have played into the Polish government’s objectives. 
 
Capitalising on the context of two gas supply disruptions, the repeated appeal by Poland 
for energy ‘solidarity’ mechanisms in regional groupings and in Council and Commission 
interactions contributed to the inclusion of the energy chapter and ‘spirit of solidarity’ in 
energy security reference in the Lisbon Treaty of June 2007, and subsequent EU policy 
that has legislated for a limited communitarisation of energy policy.   
 
3.4. Bulgaria: Passive, but becoming involved. 
 
Political will to increase energy security in Bulgaria appeared to be lacking until 2009, 
and since then characteristics of Bulgarian energy policy-making -weak administrative 
capacity, weak regional coordination, and the influence of Russia- have been obstacles to 
stated government policy of re-orientating away from dependence upon Russian energy 
interests and towards a convergence with EU energy security objectives.  
 
From 2009, a qualified shift of governmental perceptions of the energy security situation 
(with a new coalition government), along with the pressures of EU membership led to a 
rhetorical focus on diversification and the internal energy market. The disruptions also 
contributed to a stronger EU energy policy and legislative response, greater (though far 
from great) coherence and competence for the EU as an energy actor (Maltby, 2013). As a 
consequence the EU is increasingly considered an alternative, or supplementary, energy 
security guarantor, and EU accession and interaction between national and EU level actors 
has begun to affect strategic calculations on realising national preferences. Yet the limits 
of EU pressure were exposed by limited Bulgarian implementation of infrastructure 
objectives or timely transposition of EU legislation until a change of government in 2009, 
with a significant shift not apparent until 2012.  
 
The Europeanisation of energy security policy in Bulgaria, and autonomy of the Bulgarian 
government to act, has been inhibited by the historically derived economic and political 
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interests related to Bulgarian-Russian trade and energy imports. Preferences regarding 
how to ensure national and energy security in Bulgaria have altered, but weak 
administrative capacity has both undermined the capacity to transpose EU legislation, 
and to develop and implement coherent energy policy that matches Europeanised 
government objectives. There has been a distinct lack of focus on the regional level, 
though the recent initiation of interconnection construction with neighbouring countries 
demonstrates an improvement here. What remains is a lack of resources or inclination to 
be involved at the EU level. The weakness of administrative capacity in Bulgaria has made 
independent policy-making difficult, with strong influence from lobby groups. It has also 
limited the ‘energy’ expended on coordinating policy responses and promoting the 
Bulgarian government position (where known).  
 
Overall Bulgaria has been a passive EU energy policy actor, with very limited 
impact, which is increasing marginally, but the first 4-5 years of membership 
were characterised by inertia, and unimplemented objectives. 
 
3.5.  Conclusions 
 
Figure 2) which strategies have Bulgaria and Poland used to influence energy policy-
making? Table of preliminary results: 
 
Strategies employed The success of 
Polish strategy  
The success of 
Bulgarian strategy 
Hypothesis 1 - Regional and strategic 
alliance building 
Medium Low  
Hypothesis 2 – Diplomatic skill and 
learning over time of the ‘rules of the 
game’ (Intensity of interest / government 
prioritisation) 
Medium (even 
High) 
Low (improving) 
Hypothesis 3 – Relations with Russia 
(constraining or enabling energy policy-
making) 
Low High 
Hypothesis 4 – Authority derived from 
demonstrable expertise related to 
administrative capacity 
Medium to High Low (Medium 
potential) 
Hypothesis 5 – Windows of opportunity 
for policy developments (impact of supply 
disruptions) 
Low to medium High 
Source: Authors’ empirical research (methodology noted on page 2).  
 
Pressure from the EU (Europeanisation) is mostly unilateral until the point at which 
accession occurs. After this newer Member States are also able to participate in and 
shape policy, though the capacity and inclination to do so varies between Member States 
and across policy areas. For both the newer Member States examined, data gathered 
through elite interviews and primary documentary evidence suggests it is clear that 
administrative capacity has proven to be an important factor in accounting for activism 
and policy/decision-making influence, though limitations can be overcome by focusing 
limited resources on certain resources, and this is particularly applicable to smaller 
Member States. Regional groupings can play a role in diplomatic learning, allowing an 
awareness of other Member State preferences, and the development of common 
positions and more convincing appeals for EU solidarity on energy issues. For Bulgaria at 
least, the role of Russia and Russian interests in Bulgarian economics and politics has 
constrained the development of an independent Bulgarian energy policy, one that would 
otherwise likely be more in line with that of the European Commission.  
 
3.6. Implications for future enlargement 
 
Whilst the influence of Croatia and Iceland is likely to be negligible (though Iceland could 
play a role in the formation of renewable energy policy – with its extensive geothermal 
resources), Turkey would be a major energy actor with a key role as a transit state for gas 
from Russia and the Caspian region that may facilitate strong regional group activity, and 
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significant administrative capacity derived from its large size (it would be one of the 
major EU Member States due to its population size).   
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4 The Impact of ‘Widening’ on the Substantive Lourdeur of EU 
Decision-Making 
INGE DEPOORTER 
 
 
4.1.  Examining the impact of the EU enlargement on the quality of EU 
legislation 
 
The purpose here is to examine the impact of the fifth EU enlargement on what Krislov, 
Ehlerman and Weiler (1986: 34) call the substantive lourdeur of EU decision-making. The 
substantive lourdeur has a negative impact on the quality of legislation. This concept was 
used to describe the decisional malaise after the Luxembourg Compromise (1966). 
However, it is still relevant in the context of EU enlargement because sociological 
theories on group size (e.g. Simmel, 1902) indicate that an increase of the group affects 
the behaviour of the group, and, the outcome of what the group produces. 
 
The conclusions of the research on the effects of the group size on group behaviour and 
functioning are very uniform: the number of individual members in the group affects the 
functioning and performance of the group. Small groups appear to be more efficient and 
the members of small groups are more satisfied about their performance than the 
members of the larger groups (Hackman and Vidmar, 1970: 43; Hare, 1952: 261 and 
Olson, 1965). Larger groups have to deal more regularly with coordination problems, 
conflicts among the members and they need more time to finalise their assigned task(s) 
(Hackman and Vidmar, 1970: 49; Hare, 1952: 267 and Devine a.o., 2001: 670). In other 
words, an increase in the number of members of a group has an impact on the efficiency 
and quality of the group performance. Applying this to the recent EU enlargement, the 
accession of new Member States would be expected to have a negative impact on the 
quality of the adopted legislation.  
 
Good legislation means that each legislative decision has to meet certain standards in 
order to accomplish its functions. As such, the standards or requirements good 
legislation has to meet, differs with the functions we assign to legislation. This article 
examines the ability to produce clear and simple legislation, following the recent EU 
enlargement. 
 
Therefore, a number of technical standards and a number of other standards that are 
also crucial to produce clear and simple legislation are selected (see table 1).3  
 
Table 1:  Quality of EU legislation standards 
 
Quality category Quality requirement 
1. Technical quality a. length/volume of the adopted decision 
  b. length of title 
  c. title reflects content of adopted decision 
  d. (comprehensible) external reference 
  e. no use of non-legal statements 
2. Implementation and transposition a. clear transposition deadlines for Directives 
3. Consultation and due procedure a. evidence based and duly motivated decisions 
4. Subsidiarity and proportionality a. necessity of Community action 
  
b. informed and evidence-based decision-
making 
Source: Voermans, 2009 and European Communities, 2003 
 
                                                
3 These standards are selected out of the literature on quality of legislation (e.g. Voermans, 
2009 and Xanthaki, 2001) and EU documents on drafting good legislation (e.g. European 
Communities, 2003). 
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To examine the quality of legislation, a content-analysis should be conducted. Both a 
quantitative and qualitative content analysis will be conducted because using both 
research methods makes the research more complete (Holsti, 1969: 12). The main 
purpose in using this research method is to examine trends and patterns in the material 
under investigation.  
 
4.2.  Case study: Transport 
 
The research of Hagemann and De Clerck-Sachsse (2007) showed that some policy areas 
were more affected by the accession of 10 new Member States than others in terms of 
the amount of adopted legislation. One of these policy areas is the transport sector. 
Therefore, and because transport was seen as an important element in the European 
integration process (Greaves, 2000: 3), the transport sector is examined. Since the 
research focuses on the recent EU enlargement, only the transport policy legislation 
adopted by the European Parliament and the Council of the EU in the period 1999-2011 
that was still in force at the time of the research (1/03/2012) is selected (see table 2).  
 
Table 2: Research material for the quantitative content analysis 
 
Procedure started   
Adopted before 
1/05/2004 Adopted after 1/05/2004 
Before 1/05/2004 Regulations 17 4 
  Directives 17 11 
  Decisions 0 1 
  Total 34 (35%) 16 (16%) 
After 1/05/2004 Regulations 
 
19 
  Directives 
 
27 
  Decisions 
 
2 
  Total 
 
48 (49%) 
Source: Eur-lex database, author’s calculations 
 
For the qualitative content analysis only three Directives and three regulations were 
randomly selected across the three periods (see table 3). 
 
Table 3: Research material for the qualitative content analysis 
 
Period 1 Directive 2003/59/EC of 15 July 2003 on the initial qualification and 
periodic training of drivers of certain road vehicles for the carriage of goods 
or passengers, amending Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3820/85 and Council 
Directive 91/439/EEC and repealing Council Directive 76.914.EEC 
 Regulation (EC) No. 847/2005 of 29 April 2004 on the negotiation and 
implementation of air service agreements between Member States and third 
countries 
Period 2 Directive 2006/22/EC of 15 March 2006 on minimum conditions for the 
implementation of Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3820/85 and EEC No. 
3821/85 concerning social legislation relating to road transport activities 
and repealing Council Directive 88/599/EEC 
 Regulation (EC) No. 1370/2007 of 23 October 2007 on public passenger 
transport services by rail and road and repealing Council Regulations (EEC) 
Nos. 1191/69 and 1107/70 
Period 3 Directive 2011/82/EU of 25 October 2011 facilitating the cross-border 
exchange of information on road safety related traffic offences 
 Regulation (EC) No. 391/2009 of 23 April 2009 on common rules and 
standards for ship inspection and survey organisations 
IES Working Paper 3/2013                           Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby  
 
 
 
22 
 
Period 1: decision-making procedure started before 1/05/2004, decision was adopted 
before 1/05/2004 
 
Period 2: decision-making procedure started before 1/05/2004, decision was adopted 
after 1/05/2004 
 
Period 3: decision-making procedure started after 1/05/2004, decision was adopted after 
1/05/2004 
 
The legislative texts were examined on 4 quality requirements (the codebook for this 
research can be found in annex A). Table 4 presents the average number for each of 
these quality requirements. 
 
Table 4: results of the quantitative content analysis 
 
Average   Period 1 Period 2  Period 3 
Number of pages decision Regulations 7 10 10 
  Directives 7 5 7 
  Total 7 6 8 
Number of pages annex Regulations 7 10 6 
  Directives 7 30 17 
  Total 7 24 14 
Number of pages total Regulations 14 20 15 
  Directives 13 36 24 
  Total 14 30 22 
Number of words Regulations 13 10 16 
  Directives 14 11 11 
  Total 13 11 13 
Number of external references Regulations 4 11 7 
  Directives 6 9 9 
  Total 5 9 8 
Number of precise ext. 
references Regulations 2 6 5 
  Directives 3 5 6 
  Total 2 5 5 
Source: Eur-lex database, author’s calculations 
 
Period 1: decision-making procedure started before 1/05/2004, decision was adopted 
before 1/05/2004 
 
Period 2: decision-making procedure started before 1/05/2004, decision was adopted 
after 1/05/2004 
 
Period 3: decision-making procedure started after 1/05/2004, decision was adopted after 
1/05/2004 
 
The average number of pages of the decision does not show a trend in the quality of 
legislation. However, the average number of pages of the annexes does tell something. 
Comparing period 1 and period 3, table 4 shows that the average number of pages of the 
annexes doubled. The research showed that this is mainly caused by an increase in the 
number of pages of the annexes to the Directives, not to the regulations.4  
                                                
4 The results of period 2 needs to be threated carefully because only 16 EU decision could be 
included in the research material and there is one Directive with 252 pages of annexes. 
IES Working Paper 3/2013                           Dalle Mulle, Wedekind, Depoorter, Sattich & Maltby  
 
 
 
23 
 
As a consequence, the same trend is seen for the average number of pages of the 
decision and annexes taken together (total).  
 
This should indicate that the decision-makers add more technical aspects to an EU 
legislative text than before EU enlargement because the annexes should not contain new 
rights and obligations.  
 
Table 4 indicates that the average number of words of the title is more or less constant 
in the period 1999-2011.  
 
Table 4 shows that the average number of external references to other binding EU acts 
did increase over the years. According to the literature on quality of legislation 
(Voermans, 2009; Xanthaki, 2001) this means that the EU acts adopted after the 
enlargement are less clear and less readable than the EU acts adopted before the 
enlargement. The same trend is noticeable for the average number of comprehensible5 
external references. This means that far from all external references in an EU act are 
comprehensible, but there is no trend that the decision-makers add more references that 
are not comprehensible. The average number of comprehensible external references 
increased because more external references are included in the EU acts.  
 
The analysis whether or not the Directives included in the research have clear 
transposition deadlines showed that only a few had no clear transposition deadline or 
that they exceeded two years.  
 
The qualitative content analysis of the 6 EU legislative texts (see table 3) detected no 
major problems regarding the title of the EU decision reflecting the content of the 
legislative text. The subject matter and for whom the decision is of interest is clear. 
 
Non-legal statements were not detected in the enacting terms. In the recitals of each 
legislative texts under examination, at least one non-legal statement was found. Some of 
them were expressed as desires. Others can be seen as political statements. However, 
the analysis did not show that the decision-makers include more non-legal statements in 
(the recitals of) the adopted legislation after the 2004 EU enlargement. 
 
All of the examined legislative texts contain (a number of) reasons for adopting the 
particular Directive or Regulation. In other words, the texts suggest that the decision-
makers agreed on the necessity to adopt the decision. The analysis did not detect any 
shifts in the amount of reasons or in how motivated the adopted EU legislation is. 
 
Lastly, in accordance with the quality requirement on subsidiarity and proportionality, 
each of the examined EU texts made a clear statement regarding the subsidiarity and 
proportionality principle and explained (briefly) why action is necessary on the level of 
the EU. 
 
4.3.  Conclusions and discussion 
 
The EU enlargement only has had an impact on a few quality requirements with the 
objective to produce clear and simple legislation. In other words, the 2004 EU 
enlargement did not cause major problems among the decision-makers that could affect 
the clarity and readability of the outcome of the decision-making process. 
 
Another conclusion of this research is that there are still areas that need further 
examination to capture all possible areas that can be influenced by the widening process 
of the EU.  
 
First, the research can be complemented with a content analysis on the quality of the 
legislation adopted in other policy areas. Second, this research could not provide the 
                                                
5 i.e. references made to other (legal) texts with a clear mentioning of the topic of the other 
text. This makes it less necessary to examine the text to which the reference is made. 
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elements that explain why the enlarged Union does not produce notable worse 
legislation, in contrast with the hypothesis of the sociological theories on group size. 
Third, other requirements capturing other functions of good legislation could present a 
more thorough analysis of the impact of enlargement on the substantive lourdeur of EU 
decision-making. 
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Annex A - Coding Unit 
 
1. EU legislation in force (on 1/03/2012) and adopted in the period 1/01/1999-
31/12/2011 and by the Eur-lex database filed under the Transport sector cover 
the research material. 
2. Only the EU legislative texts adopted by the ordinary legislative procedure (before 
the Lisbon Treaty called the co-decision procedure) will be analysed. 
 
 
 
Coding Directory 
 
Variable Name Result Explanation 
1 # pages of decision Number i.e. the title, the recitals and the 
enacting terms 
2 # pages of annexes Number  
3 # pages of total Number i.e. variable 1 and 2  
4 # words of the title Number Not the technical name (e.g. Directive 
2003/59/EC) and not the reference(s) to 
which EU decision(s) are amended or 
repealed by the particular decision. Only 
the words that (should) cover the 
content/subject of the decision. 
5 # external references Number Only in ‘enacting terms’; only references 
to binding Community acts 
6 # comprehensible 
external references 
Number Only in ‘enacting terms’; only references 
to binding Community acts. According 
to guideline 16 of the Joint Practical 
Guideline (European Communities, 
2003) for comprehensible references 
7 Clear transposition 
deadline 
Yes/no Does not exceed 2 years (Inter 
Institutional Agreement on better-
lawmaking of 2003) 
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5 Forecasting the Implications of Turkish EU-Accession for Council 
of Ministers’ Decision-making 
GERBEN WEDEKIND 
 
 
 
5.1.  Turkey: a contested EU candidate 
 
Turkey’s EU-accession bid continues to stir debate among scholars and decision-makers. 
The reason why Turkey’s EU-membership bid is contested bluntly lies in the fact that the 
country is ‘[…] large, poor and Muslim. These three factors turn Turkey’s accession to the 
EU into a major challenge, raising anxieties and resistance in many parts of Europe’ 
(Independent Commission on Turkey, 2004: 23).  
 
Already in 2002 then Bundestag member Mattias Wissman feared that Turkey’s size 
would render the EU ungovernable: 
 
‘We have nothing against Turkey but we are of the opinion that the Union is at risk 
of breaking if one stretches it too far. When one makes it so big that it is no longer 
governable, can no longer be efficient. Turkey would soon be the largest country in 
the Union and would completely change the architecture of the EU’ (Pahre and 
Ucuray, 2006: 3). 
 
Few studies (e.g. Baldwin and Widgren; Wedekind, 2011) actually assess the implications 
of Turkish membership for decision-making practices in the EU. Since Turkey’s significant 
population (and growth rates) could indeed alter EU decision-making in case of 
membership, it is however an aspect which should not be overlooked when assessing the 
country’s membership bid. 
 
In 2011, Turkey’s population was 74 million, with an estimated annual growth rate of 
1.2% (World Bank, 2013). If Turkey would enter the EU today, it would follow Germany as 
its largest member. However, since Turkey is a candidate ‘whose accession could have 
substantial financial consequences’, its accession can only be concluded after 2014, 
when the EU’s next multi-annual programme enters into force. Conveniently ignoring 
increasing scepticism on Turkey’s accession prospects and the slow pace of accession 
negotiations, it was expected that Turkey ‘[...] will join the EU in a decade or so [...]’, thus 
around 2020 (BBC, 2010).  
 
It can be expected that by 2020, the EU will have expanded its membership-base. Besides 
Croatia becoming the 28th EU Member State as of July 2013, Turkey, Iceland and 
Montenegro are currently in the process of negotiating membership to the Union, 
whereas Serbia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo have submitted a membership request or might do so in the 
near future.  
 
Besides an increase of the n beyond 28, the EU’s demography will change. On the one 
hand, a large part of the ‘old’ EU members will experience the adverse effects of an 
ageing population, while for instance Turkey’s populace will continue to grow during the 
coming years and by 2020 it is expected that Turkey will match Germany in terms of 
population. 
 
Regarding decision-making processes, the 2009 Lisbon Treaty ascribes great importance 
to the number of Member States as well and their demographic size. Only when certain 
thresholds are met, can decision-making effectively take place in the Council of Ministers 
- the EU’s main decision-making body.56 
                                                
65 Lewis (2004: 149) states that ‘The Council is very much at the centre of EU decision-making 
and plays a pivotal role in the making of European policy’. Although the Commission and the 
EP have alike functions, their respective powers ‘[…] are not comparable to those of the 
Council.’ 
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In principle and as of 2014, proposals falling within exclusive competence areas - where 
Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) applies - can be adopted by the Council of Ministers, 
when: 
 
1) at least 55% of the Member States votes in favour of the proposal, and; 
 
2) these Member States comprise at least 65% of the EU’s population (Treaty on 
European union, 2010: 24).67 
 
Logically, it follows that change in the number of Member States and demographic size 
will significantly influence decision-making dynamics and effectiveness. 
 
 
5.2. Determinants of decision-making: effectiveness and power 
 
Turkey’s EU-membership can influence decision-making within the Council of Ministers in 
two ways. First, it can influence the ‘effectiveness’ of Council decision-making. 
‘Effectiveness’ within the Council - or its capacity to act - is captured by ‘passage 
probability’, which is ‘[…] the likelihood that a random proposal would attract a winning 
coalition, assuming that all coalitions are equally likely’ (Baldwin and Widgrén, 2005: 
332).78 Specifically, it is the number of all possible winning coalitions divided by the 
number of all possible coalitions’ (Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2009: 123).89 In the case of EU 
decision-making, it means that only those Council of Ministers’ coalitions adhering to the 
Lisbon Treaty’s provisions on QMV-voting would lead to a ‘win’. Logically, it follows that 
changes in voting thresholds or in conditions relevant to the thresholds - such as Turkish 
EU-accession - can influence the EU’s capacity to act. 
 
Second, if the EU expands, its internal dynamics will most probably change. Baldwin and 
Widgrén (2005) regard these changes in voting dynamics primarily in terms of 'power' 
which is ‘[…] an actor’s marginal contribution to the equilibrium outcome, i.e. how big 
the outcome shift would result from an actor’s marginal preference shift’ (Widgrén, 2008: 
2). Power is measured through the Shapley-Shubik-Index (SSI) which gauges the likeliness 
that a nation ‘finds itself in a position to ‘break’ a winning coalition on a randomly 
selected issue’ (Baldwin and Widgrén, 2005: 332; Wedekind, 2011). 
 
 
5.3. The influence of Turkish EU-membership on passage probability 
within the Council 
 
In order to determine Turkey’s potential impact on the Council’s decision-making 
process, one should ‘crystal gaze’ the future composition of the EU. However, as 
exemplified by similar studies’ erroneous findings (Baldwin and Widgren, 2005; 
Wedekind, 2011), forecasting is prone to errors. By taking into account various possible 
scenarios however, the probability of incorrect forecasts decreases.  
 
If Turkey becomes an EU Member, the Union will count more than 28 Member States.  
 
Therefore, a number of different yet likely scenarios, or EU-compositions, can be 
identified: 
 
                                                
7 6 However, the TEU (2010: 322) indicates that the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty’s voting 
thresholds can be postponed until 2017. 
8 7 In games where only ‘yes’ or ‘no’ decisions can be taken, the total amount of coalitions is 
2ⁿ, where n is the number of actors participating in the vote (Ade, 2005: 6). Subsequently, 
index A is calculated by dividing the number of winning coalitions W by 2ⁿ. Thus passage 
probability is captured by the formula A = W/(2ⁿ) (Holler and Owen, 2001: 300). Thus, in the 
case of the EU-27 the total number of coalitions is thus 2²⁷= 134. 217.728. 
9 8 This analysis uses Bräuninger and König’s (2001) Indices of Power 2.0 in order to calculate 
passage probability and power indices. 
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• EU-29: including Turkey as the only ‘new’ Member alongside the EU-28; 
• EU-31: including the countries currently negotiating EU Membership, i.e. Turkey, 
Iceland and Montenegro; 
• EU-33: including all Candidate Countries, i.e. Turkey, Iceland, Montenegro, 
FYROM, Serbia; 
• EU-35: including all Accession Countries, i.e. Turkey, Iceland, Montenegro, 
FYROM, Serbia, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina.917 
 
By contrasting these scenarios with similar ones although excluding Turkey (i.e. 
comparing a EU-29 with the EU-28, EU-31 versus EU-30; EU-33 with EU-32 and EU-35 with 
EU-34), one is subsequently able to find the intrinsic influence of Turkey on Council 
decision-making processes.  
 
Figure 1 outlines the passage probability in an enlarged EU inclusive of Turkey in 2020. 
As a reference-point, the current decision-making efficiency is given (2.7%). Hence it 
appears that the replacement of the Nice Treaty’s triple majority scheme with the double 
majority scheme of the Lisbon Treaty would greatly increase decision-making efficiency 
(i.e. to 11.3%).10 10  
 
In an EU-29, passage probability would be 12.3%, thus marking a 1 percentage point 
increase from the EU-28. Subsequent scenarios however would see a slight decrease in 
effectiveness as passage probability would reduce to 9.6%, 9.5% and 9.4 for the 
respective EU-31, EU-33 and EU-35 scenarios.  
 
When abovementioned figures are compared with the plots of Figure 2 – which depicts 
similar scenarios, yet excluding Turkey as an EU-member – it appears that Turkish EU-
membership would generally lead to a marginal decrease in Council decision-making 
efficiency. Only if the EU-28 would expand with Turkey passage probability would slightly 
increase. In the remaining comparisons (i.e. EU-31 versus EU-30; EU-33/EU-32, and; EU-
35/EU-34) Turkey’s EU-membership would decrease Council passage probability with 
respectively 1.5, 1.4 and 1.3 percentage points. 
 
 
 
                                                
10  
9 In this study Kosovo is omitted because the United Nations (2011) - the principal source of 
this study’s demographic data - does not possess demographic predictions for this country. 
10 Although one needs to be careful as this Figure compares 2013 and 2020 data. ` 
 
EU-28 EU-29 EU-31 EU-33 EU-35 
Nice Treaty: 2013 2,7 
Lisbon Treaty: 2020 11,3 12,3 9,6 9,5 9,4 
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Figure 1: Overview Passage Probability in an Enlarged EU including Turkey (2020) 
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5.4. The influence of Turkish EU-membership on the power distribution 
within the Council 
 
Generally, it appears that Turkish EU-membership has limited negative effects on the 
efficiency in an enlarged Council of Ministers. However, how would possible Turkish EU 
membership affect its power distribution?  
 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 depict the power distribution within an enlarged EU - including and 
excluding Turkey. At a glance, both figures appear to be very similar. The Lisbon Treaty’s 
voting provisions greatly decrease the collective power of the small1111and medium1212EU 
Member States (i.e. -17.0% and -23.9%), whereas the largest Member States in contrast 
would see their power values surge (e.g. 63.6% for Germany). The medium EU-members 
collectively would remain the most powerful in the plotted enlargement scenarios 
whereas Germany would remain the most powerful Member State, closely followed by 
Turkey (in case of scenarios in Figure 3). Moreover, enlargement would generally result in 
decreasing power values: as the EU’s membership-base expands, power needs to be 
shared among more members thus logically leading to declining power values.  
 
Figure 5 clearly shows the negative implications of Turkish EU-membership for other EU 
Member States’ power values. Each Member State - or grouping – would see its power 
decrease if Turkey would become a Member. However, the intensity of these implications 
varies across enlargement scenarios and differs among Member States. 
 
 
 
                                                
11 11 i.e. EU Member States having less than 8 votes in the Council of Ministers: Croatia, Cyprus, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovakia and 
Slovenia.  
12 12 i.e. EU Member States having between 10 and 14 in the Council: Austria, Belgium, 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Sweden. 
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For instance, whereas small Member States would see their power decrease greatly if the 
EU-28 would expand with Turkey (-22%), this would not be the case for expansion to a 
EU-31 (-1.0%), EU-33 (-1.7%) and EU-35 (-2.0%). A somewhat similar trend is visible for the 
medium EU-Member States which would see their power decrease with respectively -
16.7% (EU-29 versus 28), -12.4% (EU-31/30), -11.8% (EU-33/32) and 12.2% (EU-35/34) in 
case of Turkish EU-membership. 
 
Overall, it appears that in EU-constellations exceeding 30 Members, the large Member 
States would endure greater power losses following Turkish Membership. If the EU-28 
would expand with Turkey, Germany would lose 11.5% of its power, ranking it behind the 
small and medium Member States in terms of losses. However, if Turkey would join a EU-
30, EU-32 or EU-34, Germany would endure the largest power losses, respectively, 17.3%, 
16.9% and 16.7%. A similar pattern can be discerned for the other large Member States.  
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Figure 4: Power distribution in an Enlarged EU excluding Turkey (2020) 
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5.5.  Conclusion 
 
So will Turkey’s EU-membership render the Union ungovernable? This analysis has shown 
that – at least quantitatively - Turkey’s inclusion would not significantly decrease Council 
decision-making efficiency.  
 
In this regard, possible Turkish EU-membership would only marginally influence Council 
decision-making effectiveness. Negative differences between scenarios including and 
excluding Turkey are limited and are increasingly so as the number of candidate 
countries entering the EU alongside Turkey grows. Instead, the analysis showed that 
changes in voting regimes (i.e. from the Nice Treaty’s triple majority to double majority 
provisions of the Lisbon Treaty) appear to affect decision-making efficiency more 
profoundly than expansion of the EU’s membership-base. 
 
Turkish EU membership does however deeply impact the power distribution within the 
Council. In case of membership in 2020, Turkey would be the second largest EU member 
after Germany. All EU members would experience power losses as a result of Turkish 
membership, although the intensity would differ among Member States and enlargement 
scenarios. Small and medium-sized Member States would lose significant influence if the 
EU would expand to a EU-29 and EU-31. Large Member States then again would see their 
power decrease significantly if the EU would expand beyond 30 and with Turkey. In this 
case, Germany – although remaining the most powerful EU Member– would experience 
the most significant losses. This aspect could explain the resistance some of the Member 
States have towards Turkish EU-membership. 
 
Obviously, this study is subjected to limitations as it ignores EU institutions other than 
the Council and disregards policy preferences. Moreover, the Council generally takes 
decisions by consensus instead of QMV (Hayes-Renshaw et al., 2006: 162-163). 
Moreover, the research uses the Shapley-Shubik Index which is not a flawless instrument 
(see Paterson, 2005). Nevertheless, this analysis shows that Turkish EU-accession is not a 
black and white case, something which should be noted by policy-makers and politicians 
when assessing its Turkish bid. 
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6 Enlargement from Within? Secession and EU Membership 
 
EMMANUEL DALLE MULLE 
 
 
Recent events in Scotland and Catalonia have temporarily shifted the attention of the 
European public and policy-makers interested in the future membership of the EU from 
East to West. The success of secessionist parties in Scotland and Catalonia, along with 
their pledge to hold referenda on self-determination, has broached in the political arena 
the question of their status within the EU upon independence.  
 
As seen in the previous sections, despite sceptical forecasts on the part of scholars and 
politicians, enlargement has not per se encumbered the EU policy-making process. New 
Member States have rather found their own way within existing networks or created their 
own ones and played a constructive role in Brussels. This suggests that the possible 
accession of Scotland and Catalonia to the EU as independent countries should not a 
priori have a negative impact on the workings of the Union, all the more so as the two 
regions have been within the Union for more than 20 years already.  
 
This last section therefore focuses on rather different questions, that is, would an 
independent Scotland/Catalonia be automatically expelled from the Union or would it 
remain as a member? If the regions have to re-apply, what procedure will be followed? 
Answering to these questions is of the primary importance since the parties that are 
currently pushing for independence have based their own campaigns on the slogan 
"Independence in Europe", which takes for granted the regions' automatic membership of 
the EU upon independence. But is this true? The answer is likely to have an impact on the 
success of their bid for self-determination and, therefore, on the prospects for EU 
enlargement "from within" as well. 
 
6.1.  The Debate over Catalonia's and Scotland's EU Memberships 
 
The cases for and against independence have been widely debated by the actors 
involved. In Scotland, the Scottish National Party (SNP) has been campaigning for 
independence in Europe since the late 1980s. Its major argument since has pointed to 
the absence of precise rules about secession within the Union, which would urge the 
Commission and the Council to flexibly accommodate similar situations within the 
existing treaties - as shown by the precedent of Greenland departure (Sillars, 1989: 29-
34). The reasoning has been recently nuanced on account of the fact that Scottish 
citizens have been members of the EU and the EEC for 40 years. As the SNP suggests, 
depriving the Scots of their rights as European citizens as a result of their right to self-
determination would contradict the EU's basic principles. Scotland would therefore 
renegotiate its position within the Union (Maddox, 2012a). Similar arguments have been 
used in Catalonia by Convergencia y Unio (CiU) and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya 
(ERC), the two parties leading the campaign for the independence referendum (Traynor, 
2012; ERC, 2012). Yet, Artur Mas has framed the region's right to leave Spain on a wider 
reform of the EU into a federal state with Catalonia as a federated entity, which would 
obviously entail automatic membership (Mas, 2012).  
 
While the arguments made by the parties involved have been quite similar, the reactions 
of the respective governments have been opposed. Despite arguing that Scotland should 
have to re-apply upon independence, and that the process would be long and uncertain 
(Maddox, 2012b; Thorp and Thompson, 2011; Secretary of State for Scotland, 2013), the 
United Kingdom (UK) government has granted the Scottish Parliament the powers to hold 
a referendum in 2014 and has never suggested it would veto a Scottish EU application. 
The Spanish government, on the other hand, has vocally and consistently denied the 
legality of any referendum (Moffet, 2012; Diez, 2012; El Periodico, 2012).  
 
Finally, the European Commission has remained rather silent on the issue, and this is in 
line with its tendency to avoid stating ‘its views on matters which, as things stand, are 
purely hypothetical’ (European Commission, 2007). However, recent comments of some 
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EU representatives seem to confirm that secessionist regions will most likely have to re-
apply, although there probably will be room for flexibility in choosing the precise 
procedure. According to some, for instance, Catalonia and Scotland could retain a kind of 
passive membership during the application process, thus minimising the disruption 
generated by secession (Fontanella-Khan et al., 2012). 
 
6.2.  Some Legal Considerations 
 
In assessing the arguments made by the SNP, CiU and ERC, the question whether 
Scotland's and Catalonia's independence would be cases of secession or something else 
needs to be answered. This entails two dimensions: the domestic and international. 
 
Most elements suggest that both will be considered seceding states. Concerning 
Catalonia, from a domestic law perspective, there is not much of an alternative. The 
Spanish constitution asserts ‘the indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation, the common 
and indivisible homeland of all Spaniards’ (Cortes Generales, 1978: art. 2) and attributes 
sovereignty to the Spanish people. The fact that the Catalans call themselves a nation has 
no legal right (Delledonne, 2011: 8). As far as Scotland is concerned, the situation is a 
little more complex. The SNP has suggested that Scotland's independence would entail 
the dissolution of the UK - formed through the Acts of Union signed by the Kingdoms of 
Scotland and England in 1707. Nevertheless, this is highly unlikely to happen, as the Irish 
precedent shows.1313 
 
As far as international law is concerned, it is useful to look at the practice of the United 
Nations (UN) and to contrast it with the peculiar features of the EU. The UN was 
confronted with many instances of state secession, including the breakup of India-
Pakistan, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Federal Socialist Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FSRY) and Czechoslovakia, which are the most similar to the Scottish and 
Catalan cases. In the first two the UN accepted the claim to rightful succession made by 
the state that exercised control over most of the territory, the population, the resources 
and administrative apparatus of the previous state - i.e. India and Russia. In the third, the 
UN turned down the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's (FRY later Serbia and Montenegro) 
claim of succession on account of the small coincidence between the FRY's and the 
FSRY's territory, resources and population. Finally, the Czech Republic could probably 
have made a reasonable demand for succession, but decided with the Slovak Republic to 
re-apply on different terms (Scharf, 1995: 43-66).  
 
Thus, the rump Spain and UK will, in all likelihood, be considered the rightful successor 
states of Spain and the UK, as within their boundaries lie most of the territory, 
population, resources and administration of the former state. Nevertheless the UN and 
the EU work in very different ways and, in particular, accession to the UN does not 
require any treaty revision. In the EU this would be, at least in principle, obligatory, in 
order to adjust practical matters - such as the number of seats at the Parliament, the 
number of weighted votes at the Council and so on - to the new membership. Some then 
argue that secession from the EU is not possible without negotiation (MacCormick, 2000: 
735; Schieren, 2000: 131-133). 
 
A different legal perspective focusing on the moving treaty boundaries principle, 
however, challenges such a view. Accordingly, treaties are personal and not territorial, 
i.e., if a territory secedes from the Member State that signed the treaty, its clauses no 
longer apply there. German reunification would be a case in point, as the European 
treaties automatically extended to Eastern Germany without treaty revision as soon as the 
Democratic Republic was absorbed by the Federal Republic (Happold, 2000: 32-33).14 14 
 
Nevertheless, as Jacqué has pointed out, ‘treaty revision would have allowed the new 
situation created by German unification to have been approached from an undisputable 
legal basis’ (1991: 8). If this did not happen it is because, ‘for quite understandable 
                                                
13 13 For more details on the secession of Ireland see Mair, 1978. 
14 14 Happold also mentions a case of secession: Algeria. Upon its independence in 1962 
nobody suggested it should remain within the EEC (Happold, 2000: 33). For a position against 
Algeria being a precedent see (Schieren, 1995: 125). 
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political reasons, Member States have preferred to do without treaty revision’ (Jacqué, 
1991: 15).1515 Hence, the moving treaty boundaries principle was applied at the time, with 
the tacit understanding of the other members, but there was nothing legally compelling 
about that decision. It rather was the result of political expediency and the general 
willingness to reduce the potential disruption generated by German reunification.  
 
6.3.  Conclusion 
 
Scotland and Catalonia will almost certainly have to re-apply for membership of the EU. 
This seems the most logical conclusion stemming from the review of legal arguments for 
and against automatic membership, as well as of the practice of the UN and the 
peculiarities of the Union. However, the precise procedure that will be followed, as well 
as the specific status that will be granted to the two regions during the process are still 
open to question. Furthermore, two additional considerations should be borne in mind: 
1) the specific features of the European Treaties seem to suggest that a minimum of 
negotiations will be needed in order to settle the departure of the two regions; and, 2) 
past practice has shown that the Union tends to act flexibly with a view to 
accommodating the overriding interests of its members. 
 
Three scenarios therefore seem likely. First, the two regions could be granted a kind of 
passive membership while their application is under review. This could also be 
accompanied by a substantial acceleration of the application process, although the 
quickest procedure ever - Sweden - still took 4 years. Second, Scotland and Catalonia will 
have to negotiate from outside the Union, with negative consequences for their economy 
and the life of their citizens. Third, opposition to the process on the part of some 
Member States could be so high as to urge the regions to apply for membership of the 
European Fair Trade Association (EFTA) and the European Economic Area (EEA), a 
scenario recently predicted by Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Culture and External Affairs, 
Fiona Hyslop (Furby, 2011). This however would clearly be a setback, since it would entail 
that lack of decision-making powers which the SNP, CiU and ERC have consistently 
mentioned as one of the main reasons to seek independence.  
 
It is difficult to foresee which scenario is the most likely. This will depend first on the 
nature of the process leading up to secession and, then, on the configuration of interests 
in Europe at the time of independence. Some have argued that a few European countries, 
threatened with secessionist drives within their borders, might use the veto power on the 
accession of new members bestowed upon them by article 49 of the Treaty on European 
Union (James, 2008). This however does not seem underpinned by sufficient evidence. In 
the wake of the joint UK-Scottish announcement that a referendum on independence will 
be held by 2014, no European country has declared its willingness to use such a power. 
Furthermore, the non-recognition of Kosovo's independence by five European 
countries1616 is often mentioned as proof that the same will happen with Scotland and 
Catalonia. Yet, the two examples are very different. The main reason why some countries 
refuse to recognise Kosovo lies in the unilateral nature of Kosovo's independence. There 
is no element to suggest that these countries will similarly oppose a process of 
consensual secession (Ker-Lindsay, 2012). 
 
Nevertheless, what some European countries, and Spain above all others,1717 will clearly 
try to avoid is a precedent of automatic EU membership. This suggests that, as Scotland 
appears set to concretely confront the question of European membership before 
Catalonia, Madrid's flexibility will largely depend on the domestic situation in Spain. 
Although it is certain that automatic membership will be ruled out, there are a number of 
concessions that can be made or not during the application process, especially 
                                                
15 15 Jacqué added that the decision not to change the treaties did not guarantee proper 
representation to the population of the German Democratic Republic in the European 
Parliament.  
16 16 These countries are Spain, Romania, Greece, Cyprus and Slovakia. 
17 17 In the debate on the Scottish independence referendum, Spain, along with Cyprus, has 
been the only EU Member State that unambiguously declared its opposition to any simplified 
procedure for Scottish accession (Peterkin 2012). 
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considering that, as a part of the UK, Scotland has so far benefitted from opt-out options 
that will have to be re-discussed.    
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7 Conclusion 
 
EMMANUEL DALLE MULLE, GERBEN WEDEKIND, INGE DEPOORTER, THOMAS SATTICH, 
TOMAS MALTBY 
 
 
At a time when the EU is going through what probably is the most serious crisis since its 
foundation, enlargement still remains a lively force and a relevant topic of discussion in 
the European political arena: with political frictions in Hungary, economic problems in 
Cyprus and Slovenia, with Croatia formally becoming the 28th member of the EU on 1 July 
2013, Turkey’s and Iceland’s accession still on the agenda, and several Western Balkan 
states aspiring to membership, enlargement will soon come back into focus. Not only are 
candidate countries from South-West Europe and Turkey pursuing their negotiations for 
accession, but new unexpected members from within the Union itself might soon be 
knocking at the door of the Brussels institutions. Looking back to the previous 
enlargement rounds may help to draw some valuable lessons on how to successfully 
process upcoming enlargements.  
 
The case studies presented above point to a major general conclusion, that from the 
observed variety of adaptation strategies pursued by the new Member States and results 
obtained, it is difficult, if not impossible, to consider the members of the 2004/2007 
enlargement rounds en bloc. This conclusion becomes apparent when looking at the 
cases analysed in the energy sector, where administrative capacity –alongside with 
Russian influence in the case of Bulgaria– has proven to be an important factor in 
accounting for differences in activism and policy/decision-making influence. However, 
this does not mean that generalisations are not possible, since Member States have 
shown their capability to act collectively in order to shape policy, though the capacity and 
inclination to do so largely varies. This variation is best illustrated by the European 
energy and climate policy, where a group of actors from the new Member States 
effectively formed an advocacy coalition in the case of ETS negotiations, but not in the 
case of European policy on the promotion of renewable energy.  
 
Nevertheless, a more general concern regarding the 2004-2007 enlargement impact 
pertains not so much to the new members' capabilities to actively participate in and 
influence policy-making, but rather to the possibility that the multiplication of actors 
would paralyse the decision-making process. By looking at the outcome of decision-
making, the third section of this paper argues that the enlargement did not have a 
substantial negative impact on the quality of the EU legislation. Only a few criteria 
showed a relative decline in the average standard of the post-enlargement legislation, 
which runs counter to sociological theories of the size of groups on their functioning. 
This conclusion is confirmed by the fourth section, which looks at the possible impact of 
Turkey's accession on decision-making efficiency and dynamics in the EU’s Council of 
Ministers. The analysis shows that - at least quantitatively - Turkey’s inclusion would not 
significantly decrease Council decision-making efficiency. Indeed, negative differences 
between scenarios including and excluding Turkey are limited, and increasingly so, as 
the number of countries entering alongside Turkey grows. On the contrary, it is likely 
that institutional mechanisms - such as changes in voting regimes and thresholds - affect 
decision-making efficiency and dynamics more profoundly than the expansion of the EU’s 
membership base. 
 
Such an expansion, however, could also come in new and unexpected ways. That is, from 
EU breakaway regions. Here the peculiarity of the accession process, along with the 
absence of clear rules to guide it, have shifted the focus on the possible scenarios 
concerning Catalonia's and Scotland's status relating to the EU upon independence, 
rather than on their impact on policy-making. As suggested in this section, it is clear that 
the independent states arising thereof will have to reapply for Union membership, but 
the precise path to be followed will be largely influenced by political considerations. 
Three scenarios seem likely: passive membership until the end of the application 
process; temporary exclusion; and, in case of too high opposition, application for EFTA 
membership. What is certain is that European countries threatened with minority issues 
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will seek to avoid the setting of a precedent of automatic EU membership for a 
secessionist region.  
 
The findings in the sections above suggest that as regards the impact of enlargement 
neither the gridlock nor the business as usual scenarios were realised. Therefore, the best 
way to determine the impact of the accession of future candidate countries is to assess 
each specific case in detail, without being distracted by theoretical considerations about 
the optimal threshold beyond which decision-making would collapse. 
 
 
 
 
